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Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a general account of the development and working of 
EU law against age discrimination in employment in which that body of law is analysed and 
evaluated as the expression or realisation, however complete or incomplete it may be, of an 
EU labour right which we can think of as ‘the EU right to age equality in employment’ or 
‘the EU right against age discrimination in employment’. For this purpose, the legal 
framework concerning age discrimination is first described in general terms (section 1), and 
attention is then focused upon three areas or aspects of that body of law, namely those of 
discrimination against younger workers (section 2), discrimination against older workers in 
general (section 3), and finally the special case of retirement (section 4).  In this Introduction, 
a suggestion is put forward for a method of critical analysis of this body of law which, among 
other things, serves to explain why we single out retirement as a special case for discussion.  
This paves the way for some normative evaluations which are made throughout and are added 
to in the Conclusion to the chapter.   
 Our suggestion for a method of critical analysis of EU employment age discrimination 
law focuses on the kinds and degrees of structural change to employment arrangements 
 which are involved in its implementation; so it is the idea of ‘EU law against age 
discrimination in employment and structural change’. This might also be seen as applying in 
varying ways to EU employment discrimination law on other grounds. The idea of EU law 
against age discrimination in employment and structural change consists of an observation 
and a tentative hypothesis. The observation is that the implementation of EU employment 
discrimination law imposes a number of different demands or requirements both upon 
employers or work enterprises and upon Member States, and, crucially, that some of these 
demands or requirements involve greater degrees and more fundamental kinds of structural 
change to employment arrangements than others.  The tentative hypothesis is that great 
degrees and fundamental kinds of structural change to employment arrangements are required 
in aspects of age discrimination law in particular; and it is in respect of these structural 
changes that we will encounter the most considerable extent of legal controversy at the 
Community level and legal friction and variation of practice at the Member State level. This 
Introduction seeks to set up that observation and that hypothesis; these are then explored in 
the ensuing three sections of the chapter, together with some analytical and normative 
reflections.  
 It is useful to envisage the implementation of EU employment discrimination law in 
general and against age discrimination in employment in particular as involving various kinds 
and degrees of response on the part of employers or work enterprises and Member States 
themselves which lie along a spectrum: at one end of that spectrum are responses consisting 
primarily in the changing of attitudes and the abandonment of prejudices, while at the other 
end of that spectrum are fully fledged structural changes to employment arrangements. Thus 
for example, it would generally be agreed that the implementation of EU employment gender 
discrimination law does involve deep structural changes in employment arrangements, 
especially if we include equal pay requirements and maternity leave arrangements; and it 
 would probably be equally agreed that implementation of EU employment disability 
discrimination law also involves some structural changes in employment arrangements, since 
the idea of reasonable accommodation to disability is now clearly accepted as going beyond 
open-mindedness in selection of workers and adaptation of the physical premises in which 
work takes place and extending to more far-reaching adjustments of work patterns and work 
expectations. 
 On the other hand, it would probably be equally widely accepted that implementation 
of EU employment discrimination law on other grounds – those of race, sexual orientation, 
religion or belief, and age – does consist primarily in the changing of attitudes and bringing 
about the abandonment of prejudices, rather than involving deep structural changes in 
employment arrangements. Indeed, it might be thought that this is especially true of EU law 
against age discrimination in employment in that the framers of the Directive 2000/78/EC 
(the Framework Directive)1 were particularly concerned to ensure that its implementation 
would not involve deep structural changes in employment arrangements and embodied that 
intention in the Exceptions contained in Article 6 of the Directive, about which we shall go 
into detail in the body of this chapter.  However, we argue that there is actually a general and 
underlying tendency for the implementation of EU employment discrimination law (quite 
necessarily and appropriately in our view) to involve structural changes in employment 
arrangements even where it does not on the face of it appear to do so; and we would argue 
that the particular case of EU law against age discrimination in employment is especially 
illustrative of this tendency. 
 The tendency for the implementation of EU employment discrimination law to 
involve structural changes in employment arrangements can be in part understood as a 
dynamic which exerts itself over the medium and longer term when Member States, 
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 employers or work enterprises, and courts and tribunals and the CJEU itself engage in the 
detailed business of working out what its requirements are and how best to achieve 
compliance with them.  The very idea of bringing about the abandonment of stereotypical 
prejudices in decision-making and in inter-personal behaviour in the workplace itself turns 
out to involve reform of the processes of decision-making, and of the management of 
interpersonal behaviour in the workplace, which in turn often eventually implies a 
reconsideration of the actual organisation of employment in the work enterprise as a whole. 
We put forward the idea that the implementation of EU law against age discrimination in 
employment has presented the possibility of exactly that kind of dynamic, especially in so far 
as that law has seemed to exert pressure upon existing arrangements for the retirement of 
older workers.    
 Faced with that possibility, the various actors in the implementation of EU law against 
age discrimination in employment have had to make choices as to how far to accept and run 
with that dynamic and how far to seek to resist it.  We argue in this chapter that the story of 
the implementation of this law has thus far demonstrated some reluctance on the part of 
legislators and judges, both at EU level and at the level of the Member States, to accept or 
engage in the kind of extensive structural changes to employment arrangements and 
employment policies which the dynamic of EU law against age discrimination in employment 
seems ultimately to demand.  In fact, we find that in the face of such demands or needs for 
structural changes, younger workers and older workers are in a certain large and general 
sense played off against each other in such a way as broadly speaking to protect the status 
quo of employment arrangements in this structural sense.  Thus we shall see that the claim to 
age equality which EU age discrimination law confers upon younger workers quite quickly 
comes into confrontation with structural arrangements favouring workers in the middle and 
upper tiers of the working age range, not only on the basis of perceptions that those workers 
 are more valuable to the enterprise by reason of their greater experience of work and of the 
particular job in question, but also on the associated but distinct basis that those workers may 
actually and legitimately have acquired seniority rights to enhancements of their pay, 
conditions of employment, and entitlements upon the termination of their employment, by 
reason of the longevity of their employment. 
 On the other hand, the claim to age equality of older workers itself tends to be capped 
and circumscribed by what is perhaps the most deeply entrenched set of structural 
employment arrangements of all those which are in issue in the implementation of EU law 
against age discrimination in employment, namely those arrangements which are constructed 
around the core assumption and expectation that workers will retire at or very near the age at 
which they become entitled to an occupational pension and/or a state pension. We shall see 
that this set of structural arrangements has been quite strongly protected both by legislators 
and judges right from the inception of this body of EU regulation of age discrimination.  In 
particular, when regulations, whether contained in legislation or in collective agreements, 
authorising employers to impose mandatory retirement at pensionable age are challenged as 
discriminatory on the ground of age, it has often proved possible to defend such arrangements 
by invoking the needs of younger workers for job opportunities, so that on such occasions the 
interests of younger workers are counterpoised to those of older workers in the contrary 
direction.  However, these balances do not operate in any simple or straightforward way, and 
we suggest that the ensuing three sections might be regarded as presenting the narrative for 
an evaluation of this set of arguments, of which we offer our own normative assessment.  
 
1. Age Discrimination: The Legal Framework 
A number of competing factors have combined in recent years in Europe to create a complex 
landscape in which the legal protection for age discrimination can be examined. 
 Demographic changes in Europe have resulted in an ageing population;2 changes can be seen 
within the workforce towards a trend of early exit from the workforce; and many areas of 
Europe are experiencing high levels of youth unemployment. An awareness that age 
discrimination may play a role in causing some of these difficulties (with discrimination 
against both younger and older workers preventing their full participation in work) has led to 
both legal and policy responses to age inequality at European level, with an aim to increase 
work opportunities for younger workers as well as to encourage older workers to stay in 
work.  
 European policy initiatives have aimed to promote greater participation of older 
workers in the labour market, reverse early retirement trends and encourage ‘extended 
working lives’ through the encouragement of an ‘active ageing agenda’. Brief examples of 
EU policy initiatives in this area include the  2012 European Year for Active Ageing, which 
sought to support active ageing in all aspects of live including professional life; and the EU’s 
Europe 2020 Strategy, which sets goals for growth and jobs across the EU includes strategies 
aimed at increasing the percentage of working age people in work (defined as ages 20-65) to 
75%, showing a clear commitment towards policies of increased work participation both of 
younger workers and older workers.  
 The key legal response has been the prohibition of age discrimination. The first steps 
in this direction were taken in 1997 with the introduction of Article 6a of the Amsterdam 
Treaty which permitted the European Union to take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination on a number of grounds including age. This was followed by the adoption of 
the Framework Directive, the provisions of which, as they relate to age, are considered 
below. In addition, protection for equality in a number of protected grounds can be found in 
the Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, incorporated into EU law in the 
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 Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the concept of equality on grounds of age was recognised as a 
general principle of EU law in the case of Mangold,3 although this seems to have had little 
significance other than in the case itself, as our chapter goes on to show.  
 
The Framework Directive  
The recitals of the Directive make plain that the protection against age discrimination has 
both a social and an economic purpose: Recital 11 provides that  
Discrimination based on … age … may undermine the achievement of the objectives 
of the EC Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and social 
protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons. 
 
Moreover, it is clear from the recitals that age discrimination has some particular features that 
may make its treatment different from other grounds of discrimination. For example, while 
recital 11 applies to all grounds of discrimination, recital 25 makes explicit that age 
discrimination may be different from other grounds, as it applies only to age, and provides 
that  
differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified under certain 
circumstances … in particular by legitimate employment policy, labour market and 
vocational training objectives. 
 
Recital 14 thus allows for the retention of retirement ages, a directly discriminatory practice. 
This stands in strong contrast to other grounds of discrimination. There is no provision in 
relation to the other grounds for such broad exceptions. There is thus an element of 
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 ambivalence within the Directive towards age equality, with on the one hand its provision of 
legal protection against discrimination, and on the other hand an acceptance that employment 
policy and labour market objectives may allow for exceptions, exceptions that would not be 
accepted for the other grounds of equality. This ambivalence suggests a reluctance on the part 
of the EU legislature to require significant structural change to employment arrangements 
among EU member states with regard to EU age discrimination law.  
 Article 2 prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of age. Both 
forms of discrimination can be justified in certain circumstances. As with other grounds, 
direct discrimination can be justified where,  
by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the 
context in which they are carried out, [age] constitutes a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the 
requirement is proportionate. (Article 4) 
 
Again, in common with other grounds, indirect discrimination can be justified where there is 
a legitimate aim for any provision criterion or practice based on age, and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.  
 In addition to these exceptions which apply equally to other protected characteristics 
Article 6(1) of the Framework Directive provides additional age specific exceptions to the 
age equality principle, which apply to both direct and indirect discrimination. Thus the 
different treatment for age discrimination is clear in the terms of the Directive.  
 
Article 6 provides:  
Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not 
constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they are objectively 
 and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, 
labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary. 
Such differences of treatment may include, among others: 
(a) the setting of special conditions on access to employment and vocational training, 
employment and occupation, including dismissal and remuneration conditions, for 
young people, older workers and persons with caring responsibilities in order to 
promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection; 
(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional experience or seniority in 
service for access to employment or to certain advantages linked to employment; 
(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is based on the training 
requirements of the post in question or the need for a reasonable period of 
employment before retirement. 
 
The provisions of Article 6 mean that direct age discrimination can be justified more readily 
than discrimination on other grounds. In particular, the Directive envisages the use of labour 
market needs and employment policy as potential justifications for age discrimination. These 
exceptions are elaborated further below.  
 Age discrimination is protected symmetrically. This means that anyone of any age 
would be able to make a claim in comparison with a person of a different age. Thus although 
the underlying objective is to overcome younger people’s disadvantage in the job market due 
to age, and equally to protect against discrimination against older workers, there is no limit 
on the age comparisons that can be made. Thus a worker of 45 could make a claim of 
discrimination if treated less favourably than a 46 or 44 year old. Or a person of 55 can claim 
equality with people in their 20s or 70s, or less specifically a comparison could just be with a 
 person older or younger than the claimant. Of course if age is not the cause of the 
disadvantageous treatment, any claim will not be upheld,4 but nonetheless it is important to 
note the age discrimination claims are not limited to claims by younger or older workers.  
 Although age discrimination can be claimed by workers of any age, the legal issues 
which have arisen can be viewed in three categories. The first involves discrimination against 
younger workers, and the extent to which different treatment of younger workers amounts to 
discrimination; second, discrimination against older workers in general; and third, the 
particular issues surrounding retirement.  
 
2. Discrimination Against Younger Workers  
To a large extent, what is required with regard to EU law against age discrimination as it 
applies to younger workers relates to the abandonment of prejudice and stereotypical 
assumptions. In addition, areas of structural change can be identified that might be needed in 
employment, such as the removal of age related employment benefits linked to seniority 
which can result in prejudicial terms and conditions for younger staff. However, as will be 
seen from the discussion below, while it has been clearly active in tackling prejudice and 
stereotypes that disadvantage younger workers, the CJEU has not been so robust in requiring 
employers to make structural adjustments to employment arrangements, for example, by 
dismantling seniority based pay schemes.  
 The simplest example of age discrimination can be seen in some of the stereotypical 
and prejudicial assumptions that can be made about younger workers, for example that they 
are unreliable, unconscientious or inexperienced. As with other grounds of discrimination, 
decisions taken on the basis of stereotypical and negative assumptions about a protected 
characteristic can be challenged as directly discriminatory, and would not be justifiable under 
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 the provisions of Article 6 of the Directive. Such cases, although in practice clearly harmful, 
are therefore relatively uncomplicated in legal terms, and require little by way of formal 
change to the organisation of the workplace. Other forms of age discrimination which have 
already been formalized with regard to younger workers may be objectively justified, for 
example if restrictions apply for health and safety reasons regarding use of hazardous 
chemicals by those under 18. Moreover, a requirement to be over 18 would be a genuine 
occupational requirement in a setting where the employee is required to sell alcohol. These 
cases can be largely justified on the basis that although they may disadvantage younger 
workers in terms of access to employment, the rules and practices have been formulated for 
their protection.  
 Article 6 of the Framework Directive lists further examples in which direct age 
discrimination may be justified which apply in the case of discrimination against younger 
workers, such as the setting of special conditions on access to employment, dismissal or 
remuneration. In these cases, a beneficial element as regards the younger worker is harder to 
identify. Instead, these justifications would seem to involve entrenching the existing 
advantage provided to older workers by virtue of standard employment arrangements 
regarding seniority pay and other long service benefits. Thus far, the CJEU has set reasonably 
high standards of justification for any such discriminatory practices.  For example, in 
Kücükdeveci5 a notice period was used for dismissal calculated on the basis of length of 
service, but ignoring employment before the age of 25. The justification suggested in the case 
was that it allowed flexibility to employers with respect to younger workers, given that these 
workers would find it easier to be mobile in terms of finding new work. The CJEU rejected 
the employer’s arguments and found the notice periods discriminatory.  
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  A second thread of cases considered by the CJEU involves the use of age in setting 
pay rates. In most of these cases, pay rates linked to age have resulted in lower pay for 
younger workers, as they have had less time in which to accrue the necessary length of 
service required for the higher pay rates. The CJEU has not always accepted that experience-
related pay schemes will have an age discriminatory effect. In some cases, experience has 
been rewarded, and there is no necessary link to age. Thus in the Tyrolean airways case6 the 
Court considered a collective agreement which only took account of experience acquired with 
Tyrolean Airways when considering pay levels, rather than experience in associated airlines. 
It was argued that this was indirectly age discriminatory, as it ignored skills and knowledge 
acquired with another airline. The Court held that this pay system was not discriminatory as it 
was not linked to age.  
 Nonetheless, in most cases, pay scales which involve incremental pay rises have been 
found to have an age discriminatory effect. In relation to these cases, the Court’s approach 
has varied, with such schemes found to be justified in some cases, but found to be 
discriminatory in others.  In Hennigs7 the court rejected the setting of basic pay by reference 
to an employee’s age. This means that pay scales that use age directly to determine the pay 
grade of staff will not be lawful. However, where pay increments are awarded in accordance 
with length of service, the Court has been more flexible, so that annual incremental pay rises, 
for example, can be lawful. In Hennigs a number of reasons were given to justify incremental 
pay scales. The Court accepted the justification for differential pay rates where this was based 
on rewarding loyalty and experience. However, an additional justification was suggested, that 
of providing higher compensation to employees at a time when their needs were higher. The 
court rejected this last justification as unproven. Thus, length of service pay remains 
reasonably easy to justify where it has a reasonably direct link to experience. However, 
                                                 
6
 Tyrolean Airways (n 4). 
7
 Joined Cases C–297/10 and C–298/10 Sabine Hennigs v EisenbahnBundesamt and Land Berlin v Alexander 
Mai [2011] ECR I–7965. 
 stereotypical assumptions about financial need based on age will not be accepted as 
justifications for age related pay.  
 An acceptance that age related pay differentials can be justified can also be seen in 
Odar v Baxter Deutschland GmbH8 in which the calculation of redundancy payments was 
based on age and length of service, with payments reduced as workers got closer to pension 
age. The CJEU upheld this system as justified by the legitimate aim of protecting younger 
workers and helping their integration into employment.  
 These cases show the court to be reasonably flexible in allowing employers to justify 
age related pay and age related redundancy compensation. These are long established 
employment practices, and it is perhaps unsurprising that they have been upheld by the court 
which has recognized the importance of allowing a margin of discretion to states in 
determining employment policy, and a reluctance to require much by way of fundamental or 
structural change to employment practices with regard to age equality where it applies to 
younger workers.  
 Moreover, in most of the cases the wage settlements have been reached with the 
agreement of unions and in some cases the CJEU has pointed out that they have been agreed 
as part of a compromise between the interests of different groups of workers. Indeed, age 
related terms and conditions can be seen to benefit older and younger workers in different 
ways: older workers benefit from incremental pay systems; younger workers may benefit 
from more generous redundancy payments when they are further from being able to claim 
pension. However, the CJEU may need to be wary of assuming that the interests of all 
workers are protected through collective bargaining given that, in the UK at least, older 
workers account for a larger proportion of union members than younger workers.9  
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  An overarching issue that arises when considering age implications of pay schemes is 
that the interest in protecting employees’ acquired rights may be at odds with an interest in 
eradicating age discrimination. After all, the passage of time which allows the acquiring of 
rights clearly has an impact in terms of the age of the employee: the older the worker, the 
more likely that he or she will have acquired some rights. Thus any protection of acquired 
rights will lead to disparities in conditions, with younger workers tending to be disadvantaged 
due to the fact that they have shorter length of service. The potential dilemma into which this 
could place employers who wish to change terms and conditions, caught between the risk of 
an age discrimination claim and the risk of eroding employee’s acquired rights, was 
addressed in Specht and ors v Land Berlin.10 The case involved a salary scheme in which pay 
was calculated on the basis of a number of factors including age. This pay system was then 
amended to reward experience instead of age. However, existing staff were kept on the old 
age based salary system. Mr Specht claimed that this system was age discriminatory: the old 
system was discriminatory, and this was perpetuated by the new system. The CJEU held that 
the original age based salary system was indeed discriminatory. Although it accepted that the 
suggested aim of rewarding experience in a uniform manner could potentially justify this 
discrimination, it found that the means adopted went beyond what was necessary for this aim. 
The Court found that the new amended pay scheme was also discriminatory as it perpetuated 
the original scheme. However, it noted that the new system was introduced with the aim of 
protecting the acquired rights of existing staff. It had also been necessary to preserve the 
original pay system of existing staff in order to enable the transition to the new scheme to be 
accepted by the trade unions. These aims were legitimate and the means of achieving them 
were appropriate and necessary.  
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  The case provides a solution to what would otherwise be an intractable problem for 
employers, of how to protect younger workers from prejudicial practices while at the same 
time protecting acquired rights. In effect, it allows employers to change pay scales which are 
discriminatory, while also protecting acquired rights of staff. The approach is similar to that 
adopted in equal pay cases where ‘red circling’ is accepted as a defence to an equal pay 
claim, thereby allowing employers to protect individual staff from pay reductions while 
working to achieve equal pay across the rest of the workforce. Of course the approach to 
‘red-circling’ remains problematic, as it can perpetuate discrimination. If such an approach is 
to be taken in age cases, care needs to be taken to ensure that the protected period is not over-
long, and that any age discriminatory effects are not disproportionate.11    
  Despite the relative ease with which the Court has accepted the justification of age 
related pay differentials, nonetheless the Court has been careful to ensure that stereotypical 
assumptions cannot justify such differentials, such as that older workers have more need for 
financial security.12 Equally the court has required employers to show a link between the 
legitimate aim pursued by a pay scheme and the means employed to achieve it, in requiring 
that the means be necessary and appropriate. Where this is not the case, age discriminatory 
pay schemes have not been accepted. For example, with regard to incremental pay, the court 
has required a link to be established between the pay scheme and the aim pursued. In Hütter -
v- Technische Universität Graz 13 the Court considered a pay scheme again based on age, but 
which discounted any time spent working or training before the age of 18. Mr Hütter claimed 
that this system was discriminatory as it discounted experience based only on the age at 
which the experience was gained. The aim of the scheme was to ensure that those who had 
pursued education for longer would not be treated less favourably compared to those who 
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 pursued vocational qualifications and therefore gained additional experience of the labour 
market. It also aimed to promote entry into the labour market for young people. While the 
Court accepted that these aims could justify the difference in treatment it then went on to 
decide that the age related scheme was not an appropriate means of achieving the aims. For 
example, the criterion of the age at which the vocational experience was acquired applies 
irrespective of the type of education pursued; and as regards the aim of promoting integration 
into the labour market, this would be better achieved by setting minimum pay for younger 
workers. Thus the means used to achieve the legitimate aims was not appropriate.  
 Similarly, in the different context of sex discrimination cases, the CJEU has 
recognized that experience-related pay can only be justified where it can be objectively 
justified. In Cadman v Health and Safety Executive14  the CJEU decided that although length 
of service can serve as a way to reward experience when this enables a worker to perform 
better, the employer will need to be able to show that the experience does lead to better 
performance. For example if an employer relies solely on length of service, when the 
employee can show other ways in which he or she has gained experience then it may not be 
justifiable to rely on length of service as a sole proxy for experience.  
 
 In sum, then, although age discrimination against younger workers is outlawed by the 
Directive on equal terms with age discrimination against older workers, such discrimination 
does seem to be reasonably readily justified. Article 6(1) itself sets out explicitly examples of 
discriminatory practice that can be accepted, including setting of special conditions on access 
to employment and vocational training, separate remuneration and actions to promote 
integration in the workplace. This has allowed employers to avoid much by way of structural 
change to employment arrangements and to continue with many age discriminatory practices 
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 such as setting pay with regard to experience, and awarding lower redundancy payments to 
younger workers. The Court has however been clear that the means by which any legitimate 
aim is achieved must be appropriate and necessary, and it has also been alert to avoid 
justifications which are based on prejudicial attitudes and stereotype.  
 
3. Discrimination Against Older Workers in General 
A second area of discrimination covered by the Directive involves discrimination against 
older workers. First, and most simply, the Directive’s prohibition on discrimination would 
outlaw the use by employers of any stereotypical or prejudicial assumptions which can be 
applied in the case of older workers, such as that they may be slow to learn new skills. 
Secondly, there are specific types of workplace practice which may disadvantage older 
workers, such as requirements that individuals be below a particular age to participate in 
training. Such requirements are based on an assumption that the employer will want a return 
on its investment in training, and so will want a minimum number of year’s employment after 
the training has taken place.  
 This aspect of age discrimination is addressed specifically in Article 6 (1)(c) which 
provides that fixing of a maximum age for recruitment based on the training requirements or 
the need for a reasonable period of employment before retirement is an example in which age 
discrimination can be justified. This exception in the text of the Directive provides a clear 
example of the extent to which the legislature was concerned to ensure that employers would 
not need to undertake deep structural change in employment arrangements in their 
implementation of EU law against age discrimination in employment. 
 These provisions have been examined by the CJEU, in Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am 
Main.15 This German case involved rules in which a maximum age of 30 was imposed for the 
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 recruitment fire fighters in the fire service. The government argued that the age limit was 
necessary to guarantee the operational capacity and proper functioning of the professional fire 
service. The government produced scientific evidence which showed that respiratory 
capacity, musculature and endurance diminish with age. Very few fire fighters over 45 have 
sufficient physical capacity to perform the fire-fighting part of their activities, and at 50 the 
officials no longer have the capacity for rescuing people. Officials over the ages of 45 and 50 
worked in the other types of activity such as the maintenance and control of protective 
equipment and vehicles. Although there was work for older workers to do, however, if was 
felt necessary to require that staff start their career younger so that the fire service could have 
the benefit of a substantial period of service at full physical capacity, before being moved to 
less onerous duties, and so to ensure full operational capacity for the fire service. 
 The CJEU upheld the age related rule, deciding that the Directive does not preclude 
the setting of age limits on recruitment in this context. The aims related to operational 
capacity and were legitimate, particularly in the context of emergency services. Moreover, 
the imposition of an age limit did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve that 
objective, particularly given that there was objective data suggesting that this capacity 
reduced after the age of 45. It was thus accepted that there was a need to recruit by the age of 
30 in order to ensure that fire-fighters would have a comparatively long period of their career 
operating at these high levels of physical ability, before they might be moved to lighter 
duties. It may be interesting to note here that if employers move towards greater 
accommodation of the needs of older workers, as we suggest in our conclusions, this may 
create a corresponding increase in this type of situation, whereby employers may wish to 
ensure that accommodations are only provided to staff after a reasonable length of service.  
 A second example of the implementation of the rules against age discrimination for 
older workers can be found in relation to training. Here older age may be a negative factor in 
 the decision of the employer to offer or fund training. In the UK case of Homer v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire Police16 a training requirement was imposed on all staff, which 
disadvantaged Mr Homer because he was due to retire. Mr Homer worked as a legal advisor 
for the Police National Legal Database. A new grading system was introduced three years 
before he was due to retire, which required a law degree in order to reach the top tier. Mr 
Homer did not have a law degree and so was graded at a lower tier. If he were to undertake 
the requisite study to become eligible for the higher pay grade, he would be retired before he 
could benefit from it. The Supreme Court held that the law degree requirement was indirectly 
discriminatory, and would need to be justified. When the case returned to the first tier 
Employment Tribunal the requirement was found not to be justified. Although the aim of 
recruiting and retaining staff of an appropriate calibre was legitimate, and the new grading 
structure was appropriate and necessary way to achieving the aim, nonetheless imposing 
requirement on existing legal advisers was not justified.  
 It is interesting to note the difficulty posed in cases of changes to terms and conditions 
which inevitably have an age related impact. As noted above, changes to less favourable 
conditions usually have a detrimental impact on younger staff; in Mr Homer’s case, he was 
disadvantaged, as an older worker due to the small amount of time he had to comply with the 
change in rules. A strict approach to causation in relation to disadvantage in these cases, 
along the lines of the approach in Dekker17 and James v Eastleigh18 would mean that these 
cases could be viewed as direct discrimination, which although justifiable in the context of 
age, nonetheless can only be justified on limited grounds, in accordance with Article 6. The 
level of scrutiny for indirect discrimination is less strict, and such changes can therefore be 
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 allowed, where they serve a legitimate aim and are proportionate. In many instances, this will 
be the case; otherwise no changes to terms of employment could be allowed.  
 Apart from issues of training, additional types of discrimination that can be suffered 
by older workers relate to reduced access to benefits on the basis of proximity to retirement. 
Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund, acting on behalf of Erik Toftgaard v Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet19 concerned the Danish law which allows for the award of three years 
“availability pay” to civil servants in case of redundancy, in order to retain a pool of available 
staff in case of an increased demand for staff. The aim of this payment is to enable the state to 
restructure the public administration by maintaining the availability of civil servants with a 
view to their assignment to a suitable alternative post; whilst at the same time protecting civil 
servants from undue personal and political pressure. However “availability pay” is not paid to 
those over pensionable age, who are less likely to be under such pressure as they have 
alternative means of financial support, and equally are unlikely to be looking for alternative 
work if it were to become available. The claimant brought a claim, arguing that the Ministry's 
refusal to provide availability pay amounted to direct and indirect age discrimination. The 
CJEU held that this law did breach the Framework Directive. Whilst the rule had a legitimate 
aim the Court held that the means used to achieve that aim were not necessary, as the same 
objective could be achieved by less discriminatory measures. In particular, those of 
pensionable age were not given a choice between taking a pension or availability pay. The 
same objective could be achieved in a non-discriminatory way if staff of pensionable age 
were given a choice to either take pension, or to temporarily sacrifice pension and elect 
instead to take availability pay and make themselves available to work. 
 In effect, then, when it comes to discrimination against older workers, we can again 
see a level of ambiguity in the Court’s approach. To an extent we can identify some 
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 reluctance by the Court to require deep structural change in employment arrangements, in 
that a number of legitimate aims have been identified that can justify age discrimination, such 
as reduced redundancy awards as staff reach pensionable age. The court has also accepted as 
justified workplace rules relating to training and pay that are less favourable to older workers. 
Nonetheless, the court has been fairly strict in terms of the standard of scrutiny applied to 
these discriminatory rules, and has required careful attention to be paid to whether the means 
used to achieve the aim are appropriate and necessary.  
 
4. Age Discrimination and the Special Case of Retirement 
The final area for discussion with regard to age discrimination in employment is retirement. 
Clearly, in a Directive aimed at equal treatment on grounds of age in employment and 
occupation, retirement is likely to be a major feature of the case law. Given that retirement is 
directly related to age, mandatory retirement or other practices surrounding retirement will 
have an age related impact. However, retirement has long been an established part of 
employment policy, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that retirement at the employer’s 
initiative itself is not prohibited by the Directive. Indeed recital 14 states that the Directive 
“shall be without prejudice to national provisions laying down retirement ages”. 
 From this, it might have seemed that matters related to retirement would fall outside 
of the remit of the Directive. However, fairly early on in its jurisprudence the CJEU 
established that while state retirement ages are not of themselves discriminatory, this does not 
mean that the Directive will not apply to measures governing the termination of 
employment.20 As a result, reliance on state retirement ages by employers to terminate 
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 employment still amounts to direct discrimination and thus mandatory retirement provisions 
require justification under Article 6 of the Directive.21  
 The concept of retirement is not provided for explicitly in the differences in treatment 
that can be justified which are enumerated in Article 6. However, the list is not exhaustive, 
including the broader list in the first part of Article 6 “legitimate employment policy, labour 
market and vocational training objectives”. Thus the CJEU accepted the UK Government’s 
argument in The Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Aging v. Secretary of State 
for Business22 that the default retirement age of 65 in the UK was justified as a measure to 
enable employers to manage workforce planning. The Court allowed that Member States 
have a certain degree of discretion in defining legitimate employment or social policy aims, 
and so the retirement age could potentially be justified even though the workforce planning 
aim was not included in the list of legitimate aims contained in Article 6(1).  
 The Court confirmed that any aims had to relate to social policy with a public interest 
nature. This was contrasted with “individual reasons particular to the employer's situation, 
such as cost reduction or improving competitiveness”. However it was also pointed out that 
“a national rule may recognise, in the pursuit of those legitimate aims, a certain degree of 
flexibility for employers."23  
 Thus the position was swiftly established that retirement provisions are not exempt 
from the supervision of the Court, but that they can be justified where there is a legitimate 
aim and the provisions are proportionate. This has led to a number of cases coming before the 
CJEU, in which a range of justifications for retirement provisions have been considered. A 
number of these will be reviewed below. As with other areas of EU law against age 
discrimination in employment, we can see in the cases a reluctance to require deep structural 
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 change in this context, as the Court requires on the one hand that retirement provisions be 
subject of review, whilst on the other hand not imposing particularly strict scrutiny of the 
proportionality of many mandatory retirement schemes.   
 The first case on retirement to be considered by the CJEU was Felix Palacios de la 
Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA.24 As well as establishing that retirement was covered by the 
Directive, this Spanish case also involved the issue of justification of retirement provisions 
contained in a collective agreement. Mr Palacios de la Villa challenged his retirement under 
an agreement which provided for a retirement age of 65, subject to the condition that 
retirement would only be enforced if workers had made sufficient contributions to be able to 
retire on a full pension. The CJEU confirmed that high standards of justification would be 
required, but found that the aim of promoting better access to employment by means of better 
distribution of work among different generations was legitimate. Although not set out in these 
terms, the aim of promoting access to employment was a legitimate aim of employment 
policy. Thus the CJEU has been clear from its earliest cases that under EU law against age 
discrimination in employment the aim of redistributing work among different generations is 
legitimate and retirement is an appropriate and necessary way to achieve this aim. This has 
been confirmed over and again in CJEU case law,25 including in Hörnfeldt v Meddelande.26 
 However other aspects of the case mean that it would be unwise to assume that 
retirement will always be justified; while the level of scrutiny may be low, scrutiny does take 
place. In Palacios the Court also took into account the fact that the retirement scheme in 
question had been agreed as part of a collective agreement, and only applied if the individual 
qualified for a full pension. It was in this context that the court found that the provision was 
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 proportionate as it was appropriate and necessary to the policy aim. Thus this early case on 
retirement did not send any particularly strong steer as to how retirement would be treated: on 
the one hand, the CJEU accepted potential legitimate aims that are less clearly articulated 
than those contained in Article 6 and so could be taken to point to a light touch review of 
retirement provisions. On the other hand, the Court gave weight to the fact that the retirement 
provisions were contained in a collective agreement and only applied where full pension had 
accrued. The fact that Mr Palacios had accrued a full pension was therefore a relevant factor 
in determining the proportionality of the retirement provision. This could mean that 
mandatory retirement would be harder to justify where these factors were not present.   
 Yet later cases on retirement suggest that the Court have continued with the light 
touch standard of review when it comes to justifying retirement. For example, it also upheld 
that mandatory retirement was justified in the case of Rosenbladt,27 a case which is very 
similar to Palacios, with the difference that that the pension provision available for Ms 
Rosenbladt was much lower as her hours were much lower.  The approach of the court was 
very similar despite this difference in the facts: Ms Rosenbladt was retired in accordance with 
a collective agreement that provided for retirement at the age of 65, where the employee can 
draw a retirement pension. The Court again decided that retirement was objectively justified, 
with the legitimate aim of better distribution of work between the generations, and in the 
context that retirement was only imposed where there was sufficient pension. The Court 
upheld the necessity and appropriateness of the agreement despite the fact that when applied 
to Ms Rosenbladt personally, the caveat regarding sufficient pension did not really apply, due 
to her very fractional appointment which gave rise to a very small pension. Indeed, the 
Court’s response to the financial difficulty Ms Rosenbladt was in was the rather 
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 unsympathetic observation that the provisions mandating retirement did not prevent her from 
seeking another job.  
 Rosenbladt serves as an illustration of another factor which the Court has taken into 
account, and that is the balance between the broader social policy aim and its impact on the 
individual. In Ms Rosenbladt’s case, her pension provision was very low. The employment 
policy aim of  balancing the interests of older workers against those of younger workers is 
usually based on assumptions that the older workers will already have accrued pension and so 
can afford to hand over the job to younger workers whose financial need is greater. Given 
that this was not the case, it was open to the Court to consider whether it was appropriate and 
necessary to implement the retirement provision in the context of a worker whose financial 
position was so precarious. Instead, the Court upheld the general provision regarding 
mandatory retirement. This approach was confirmed in Hörnfeldt v Meddelande.28 This case 
considered whether compulsory retirement age of 67 in Sweden was justified under the age 
provisions of the Equal Treatment Framework Directive. Mr Hornfeldt’s employment for the 
Swedish postal service ended when he reached 67 in accordance with the national retirement 
age. Mr Hornfeldt had worked part-time so had a reduced pension and so he brought 
proceedings to challenge the 67 year rule as age discriminatory. The CJEU confirmed that a 
blanket rule on retirement could be justified, on grounds as established in other cases such as 
Rosenbladt. Although compulsory retirement resulted in some hardship to the individual 
because of his individual pension level, compulsory retirement was still proportionate. Thus 
the wider policy aims served by retirement can justify retirement practices even if their 
implementation in the particular case causes hardship.  
 The reluctance of the Court to address the individual hardship that such generalised 
retirement rules can cause confirms the trend in EU law on age discrimination against 
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 requiring significant structural change in employment arrangements. However, as the 
following cases illustrate, the Court has remained more vigilant when it comes to prohibiting 
reliance on stereotypes and prejudicial assumptions in the setting of retirement conditions. 
 Thus, where retirement schemes have involved the use of legitimate aims which 
themselves may have a discriminatory basis, these have been found to be discriminatory and 
unjustified.  In Petersen v Berufungsausschuss fur Zahn fur den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe29 the 
Court was asked to decide whether national rules which provided for a retirement age of 68 
for dentists working in public health care were allowed under the Directive. The government 
argued that the rule was needed to protect patients’ health as it was stated that ‘general 
experience’ indicated that after the age of 68 dentists’ work performance was likely to 
decline; secondly it was necessary to free up jobs and career opportunities for young dentists. 
Although it allowed the latter aims regarding work opportunities for younger workers, the 
CJEU held that the first reason did not pass the objectivity test. In particular, the age limit of 
68 did not apply to dentists operating in the private sector, showing that the assumption that 
performance deteriorates after the age of 68 was based on stereotypes rather than on actual 
evidence.  
 A second case also rejecting the use of stereotypical assumptions about deterioration 
of performance as a justification for mandatory retirement is Prigge v Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG30 which involved the retirement of pilots at the age of 60, in accordance with a collective 
agreement with the aim of maintaining safety. The Court considered the case under Article 
4(1), the genuine occupational requirement exception, and accepted that capacity to act safely 
as a pilot was a genuine occupational requirement. However, it found that reliance on the 
requirement was not proportionate because international and national rules, as well as the 
practice of other airlines, did not require retirement at the age of 60. Although the court 
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 rejected the Article 6 basis of the case (as air safety was not a legitimate aim under Article 6), 
the case does add weight to the proposition that stereotyped assumptions regarding age and 
deteriorating performance will not be allowed to justify retirement. These cases can be 
compared with the findings in the Wolf case, above, where reduced capacity to act as a fire 
fighter after the age of 50 was accepted because of the detailed scientific data used to 
substantiate the claim.  
 The CJEU’s robust approach to what might be seen to be prejudicial assumptions by 
employers has not always been consistent, however. Other retirement cases have involved 
more indirectly stereotyped assumptions about performance and age, which have been 
accepted as justified by the Court. First, there have been cases in which the legitimate aim of 
a retirement policy has involved the aim of ensuring a mix of ages in the workforce.  
Georgiev v Technicheski universitet – Sofia, filial Plovdiv31 involved retirement rules for 
academic staff in the Higher Education sector in Bulgaria. The rules in question required that 
staff at 65 no longer had permanent contracts, but were employed on one year contracts, for a 
maximum of 3 years, effectively imposing mandatory retirement at 68. In its judgment the 
Court confirmed its earlier approach allowing that the rules could be justified for the 
legitimate aim of encouraging recruitment and retention of younger academics, and to that 
extent the case is uncontroversial. However, it also appeared to accept as legitimate the aim 
of ensuring “the quality of teaching and research by renewing the teaching staff through the 
employment of younger professors”32 and confirmed the importance for universities of 
maintaining a “mix of different generations of teaching staff and researchers’ in order ‘to 
promote an exchange of experiences and innovation, and thereby the development of quality 
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 of teaching and research at universities.”33 Such an aim seems somewhat suspect. It is surely 
falling into stereotypical thinking to assume that the quality of teaching will be maintained by 
‘renewing the teaching staff’ and replacing older professors with younger ones. Thus, as a 
general aim applied to a sector of workers the Court’s acceptance of this aim can be 
criticized. Yet this acceptance of the need for a balance of ages seems again to have been 
accepted in Fuchs and Kohler v Land Hessen.34 This case involved a retirement scheme 
under which retirement occurred at the age of 65, subject to the possibility that staff may 
continue to work, if it is in the interests of the service, until the maximum age of 68. The 
court accepted, among others, that the aim of establishing a balanced age structure was a 
legitimate aim for the mandatory retirement scheme. 
 The requirement for a balance between generations was only one of a number of aims 
identified in Fuchs. Another aim identified in Fuchs as well as many other cases, including 
Petersen, Palacios, and Rosenbladt is the aim of avoiding disputes relating to employees’ 
ability to perform their duties beyond the age of 65. For example in Rosenbladt35 the CJEU 
accepted the aim of avoiding the dismissal of employees “on the ground that they are no 
longer capable of working, which may be humiliating for those who have reached an 
advanced age.” In Fuchs the court accepted as legitimate the aim of preventing “possible 
disputes concerning employees’ fitness to work beyond a certain age” 36 In Hörnfeldt v 
Meddelande37 the CJEU confirmed as legitimate the aim of avoiding “a situation in which 
employment contracts are terminated in situations which are humiliating for elderly 
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 workers”.38 To the extent that this aim makes an assumption that performance deteriorates 
with age, and that older workers may need help in recognizing this, the aim can be seen to 
rely on stereotypes and thus to be discriminatory in nature. Even termed more positively as 
the aim of preserving ‘collegiality’ between staff by avoiding performance management 
processes as was the case in the UK Supreme Court case of Seldon v Clarkson Wright and 
Jakes39 this aim has the potential to justify direct age discrimination on the basis of exactly 
the prejudicial assumptions that Directive was designed to combat. 
 The cases show then a general acceptance of retirement as serving a number of 
legitimate aims. Aims such as intergenerational solidarity and the freeing-up of jobs for 
younger workers seem to be accepted as relatively uncontroversial by the CJEU. Other aims 
may be seen as more contentious as they arguably rely on assumptions regarding a decline in 
performance with age, and yet these too have been accepted. In general, the Court has given a 
fairly wide margin of discretion to States in forming labour market policy relating to 
retirement, reflecting a general reluctance to require deep structural change in the labour 
market that may be required if full and deep equality on grounds of age is to be achieved.   
 
Conclusion 
In the course of this chapter, we have given an account of EU law concerning age 
discrimination in employment, and its implementation in the Member States, in such a way as 
both to provide a general narrative of the evolution of that body of law and also to identify 
the senses in which and the extent to which EU law concerning age discrimination in 
employment turns out to require structural changes in employment arrangements and even, in 
a larger way, some aspects of employment policy. In pursuit of this theme of EU law against 
age discrimination in employment as connoting structural changes, two concluding points 
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 may usefully be drawn out of our general narrative. The first point consists of re-emphasising 
the possibility of some unintended consequences of introducing the type of deep structural 
change that might be required for full age equality to be achieved, in particular with regard to 
the modification of arrangements for retirement. The second and final point concerns 
structural change and the idea of reasonable accommodation. 
 The point about possible unintended consequences of structural changes brought 
about by what might be termed a deep commitment to age equality in employment is well 
illustrated by the story of its implementation in the UK with regard to arrangements for 
mandatory retirement at pensionable age.  In the UK, such arrangements had been 
commonplace before the advent of EU law against age discrimination in employment, in the 
sense that contracts of employment habitually provided for the employee to retire at 
pensionable age or entitled the employer to require the employee so to retire, and 
employment legislation protected that practice.  It was clear from the outset that the 
compliance of that regime with the requirements of EU law against age discrimination in 
employment was somewhat questionable. The UK government introduced legislation in 2006 
with the purpose of continuing to protect that practice under conditions designed to ensure 
compliance with EU law; this was the so-called ‘default retirement age’ regime.   
 The succeeding government, wishing to pursue a policy of encouraging the extension 
of working life (probably with a view to relieving pressure on the system of state and 
occupational pension provision in the face of the economic crisis and the increasing longevity 
of the working population), changed direction and invoked EU law against age discrimination 
in employment (almost certainly going beyond what the CJEU had indicated as necessary) to 
sustain the introduction of legislation which generally disabled employers from imposing 
mandatory retirement upon their workers unless they could show some special justification 
for maintaining that practice. This could be regarded as a signal achievement for EU law 
 against age discrimination in employment; however, there are some indications that such a 
rigorous restriction upon mandatory retirement at pensionable age, which undoubtedly effects 
a deep structural change to existing employment arrangements, might have the unintended 
consequences of incentivising employers to limit the duration of their employees’ careers by 
other means, in particular by employing them from the outset on fixed-term contracts rather 
than open-ended ones, or by developing stricter systems of ‘performance management’ to 
enable themselves to terminate the employment of older workers more easily.40   
 The second and final point, concerning structural change and the idea of reasonable 
accommodation, may be briefly made.  It is that if our arguments are accepted that the 
implementation of EU law against age discrimination in employment does produce a dynamic 
towards structural changes in employment arrangements, and that there may be unintended 
consequences of such structural changes, then it becomes especially important to identify the 
points at which that EU law may be developed most effectively with the least ‘collateral 
damage’.  We suggest that in this respect, one avenue which might be most profitably 
followed, by the methodology of controlling unjustifiable direct or indirect age 
discrimination, is that of developing or further developing notions of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ to the particular needs of younger workers and, even more particularly, of 
older workers. For example, older workers may wish to work more flexibly, with a reduced 
number of working hours spread over a number of days.41  
 We are consciously suggesting that the analogy with employment disability 
discrimination law may be a fruitful one in this respect. Such a move would require 
employers to adapt workplace arrangements to meet the needs of younger and older workers. 
If this analogy with reasonable adjustment to disability is a potentially helpful one, we should 
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 not however assume that it could be applied in a simple or direct way to the complex and 
rather different situation of older workers. Whilst such a development would involve some 
elements of structural change to employment arrangements, it would at the same time move 
us towards achieving the underlying social and economic aim of EU law against age 
discrimination in employment, that is promoting greater inclusion of older and younger 
workers within the workplace.  
 
 
 
